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Getting Personal in Supreme Court Opinions 
Joseph L. Smith* 
“Justice Scalia does not (and cannot) explain why Congress 
would define ‘air pollutant’ so carefully and so broadly, yet 
confer on EPA the authority to narrow that definition 
whenever expedient.”1 
“Justice Breyer’s reliance on the average hourly rate for all of 
respondents’ attorneys is highly misleading.”2 
“Justice Breyer would not only put such extraordinary weight 
on admitted dicta, but relies on the statement for something it 
does not remotely say.”3 
‘Justice Thomas is thus wrong in stating that our approach 
might suggest ‘a policy-driven preference for government 
monopoly over privatization.’”4 
“And Justice Stevens is dead wrong to think that the right to 
 
 * Joseph L. Smith, PhD (1999). Associate Professor and Chair of 
Political Science at the University of Alabama. 
 1 Justice John Paul Stevens in Massachusetts v. Environmental 
Protection Agency. 
 2 Justice Samuel Alito in Perdue v. Kennedy. 
 3 Chief Justice John Roberts, Parents Involved in Community Schools 
v. Seattle School District No. 1. 
 4 Chief Justice John Roberts in United Haulers Association v. Oneida-
Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority. 
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petition is ‘primarily collective in nature.’”5 
These quotes, all taken from recent Supreme Court majority 
opinions, are quite harsh. To be told by a peer, in official documents 
certain to be read and publicized broadly, that one’s reasoning is 
baseless, misleading, or “dead wrong” must be irritating. Beyond the 
public criticism, targeting the justices by name adds to the insult. 
These opinion authors could have softened the impact by aiming their 
criticism at “the dissent” or “the concurrence.” Statements like those 
above, which name another justice in the process of criticizing his or 
her work, may be an indicator, a cause, or a consequence of frayed 
relationships on the Supreme Court.  
This Article focuses on these personal references. First, it explains 
their importance and how they have become much more common in 
recent terms. Then, it discusses which Justices make personal 
references most frequently, and who names whom. The Article 
concludes with thoughts on how these patterns relate to relationships 
among the Justices and the work of the Court. 
THE ROLE OF PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS ON THE COURT 
Scholars have long viewed personal relationships on the Court as 
potentially important.6 The Justices have to work together to choose 
cases for review, resolve disputes, and produce opinions of the Court. 
Majority opinions are often refined through multiple rounds of 
negotiation and compromise. Amicable relationships can smooth 
these processes.  
Beyond the overall functioning of the Court, relationships 
between individual Justices can influence the formation of coalitions. 
More than fifty years ago, Walter Murphy noted, “friendship and the 
 
5 Justice Antonin Scalia in District of Columbia v. Heller. 
6 See, e.g., WALTER J. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY (1964); 
and Patricia M. Wald, Some Thoughts on Judging as Gleaned from One 
Hundred Years of the ‘Harvard Law Review’ and Other Great Books, 100 
HARV. L. REV. 887, 905-906 (1987).  
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social amenities . . . help determine with whom a [J]ustice is more apt 
to interact and with whom he will probably continue to negotiate 
even after an impasse has seemingly been reached.”7 
Direct evidence about the level of harmony among justices is hard 
to come by. When they speak of it at all, Justices tend to describe the 
Court as harmonious. In an appearance on The Late Show, Justice 
Breyer told Stephen Colbert, “I have never heard a voice raised in 
anger . . . . [W]e are good friends.”8 Other Justices have said much 
the same, insisting that personal relations on the Court are cordial and 
professional.9 However, scholars and insiders have uncovered trends 
suggesting more acrimony among the Justices than they publicly 
acknowledge. Yalof, Mello, and Schmidt found that the proportion of 
non-collegial concurring and dissenting opinions increased during the 
first four years of the Roberts Court compared to the last four years 
of the Rehnquist Court, which was itself viewed by scholars as a 
model of disharmony.10 Wedeking and Zilis explore the relationship 
between policy goals and using disagreeable language in Court 
opinions.11 They suggest that harsh language is a means of getting 
increased attention for policy goals.12 Although such language may 
damage relations among the Justices, it signals the intensity of the 
 
7 WALTER J. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 53 (1964). 
8 Interview by Stephen Colbert with Stephen Breyer, Associate Justice, 
United States Supreme Court, The Late Show (CBS television broadcast 
Sep. 14, 2015). 
9 Phillip Allen Lacovara, Un-Courtly Manners-Quarrelsome Justices Are No 
Longer a Model of Civility for Lawyers, 80 A.B.A. J. 50 (1994). 
10 David A. Yalof, Joseph Mello, and Patrick Schmidt, Collegiality Among 
US Supreme Court Justices: An Early Assessment of the Roberts Court, 95 
JUDICATURE 12 (2011). On the Rehnquist Court, see MARK TUSHNET, A 
COURT DIVIDED: THE REHNQUIST COURT AND THE FUTURE OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 63-66, 149-151, 207-208 (2005). 
11 Justin Wedeking and Michael Zilis, The Use of Disagreeable Language in 
Supreme Court Opinions, (Oct. 19, 2015), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2628819. 
12 Id. at 8. 
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author’s views and may attract the attention of Congress, lower 
courts, or other influential actors.  
Judicial professionals from Washington, D.C., who may have 
access to inside information, have identified Justice Scalia as driving 
the increased use of harsh language toward other justices. Judge 
Wald of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals was among the first to 
notice Justice Scalia’s tendency to deploy sarcasm and derisive 
language toward other Justices.13 Former U.S. Deputy Solicitor 
General Philip LaCovara identified Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and 
Thomas among those likely to aim punitive language at opposing 
opinions, but singled out Justice Scalia as the harshest attacker.14 
Lacovara goes on to suggest that Scalia's rhetoric had consequences 
for the Court: “The strained relationship between Justices Scalia and 
Sandra Day O'Connor, for instance, is now approaching an 
embarrassing intensity. Once expected to become jurisprudential 
allies, today they rarely say a civil word about one another in their 
opinions.”15  
A few empirical investigations have explored the relationship 
between opinion language and the social climate on the Court. Long 
and Christensen argue that increased use of linguistic “intensifiers” 
(such as “clearly,” “obviously,” or “very”) in judicial opinions 
indicates that the author feels threatened in some way.16 They find 
that conservative Justices show higher use of intensifiers than liberal 
Justices, and that all Justices use more intensifiers in dissents 
 
13 Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: 
Judicial Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371 (1995). 
14 Phillip Allen Lacovara, Un-Courtly Manners-Quarrelsome Justices Are 
No Longer a Model of Civility for Lawyers, 80 A.B.A. J. 50 (1994). 
15 Id. at 52. See also Linda Greenhouse, Even in Agreement, Scalia Puts 
Roberts to Lash, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 29, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/28/washington/28memo.html 
16 Lance N. Long and William F. Christensen, When Justices 
(Subconsciously) Attack: The Theory of Argumentative Threat and the 
Supreme Court, 91 OR. L. REV. 933 (2012). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol54/iss1/19

















compared to majority opinions. Justice Scalia used more intensifiers 
than other Justices.  
Judge Wald has suggested that referring to a fellow judge by name 
is particularly aggressive and uncivil:  
One mark of an old animosity is repeated identification of the 
“enemy judge” by name; I once counted my own name (or title 
as Chief Judge) used over two dozen times by a majority in a 
case in which I was dissenting. Friendly fire, on the other hand, 
refers instead only to “the dissent” or “our dissenting 
colleague,” elevating the dispute to a more impersonal plane. 17  
The fact that Judge Wald not only noticed, but counted personal 
references to herself suggests she saw them as unusual and 
potentially divisive. Similarly, Scott and Gobetz argue that the 
tendency to single out other Justices for criticism indicates an 
individualistic, rather than communal, feeling among the Justices.18 
They measured this tendency by counting references to particular 
Justices in 711 Supreme Court opinions issued between 1969 and 
1992.19 Such references to fellow Justices increased dramatically over 
the time period. Justice Scalia made more such references than any 
other Justice.   
Beyond relationships within the Court, evident disharmony among 
the Justices may undermine respect for the Court as an institution.20 
Strident language aimed at other Justices is likely to pique the interest 
of journalists and be publicized. It is possible that strong and evident 
disagreement undermines the Court’s image as an apolitical branch 
and ultimately the perceived legitimacy of its decisions.21 Posner 
 
17 Wald, supra note 6, at 1381. 
18 David K. Scott and Robert H. Gobetz, The US Supreme Court 1969-1992: 
A Shift Toward an Individualistic Style of Judging, 54 COMMC’N STUDIES 
211 (2003). 
19 Id. at 217. 
20 Wedeking and Zilis, supra note 11.  
21 See, e.g. Stephen A. Newman, Political Advocacy on the Supreme Court: 
Washington University Open Scholarship

















suggests strong language in opinions “lowers the reputation of the 
judiciary in the eyes of the public.”22 
 
PATTERNS IN PERSONAL REFERENCES TO OTHER JUSTICES 
 
To investigate whether personal references are increasing, and 
how they are deployed, I focus on three questions: 
 
One: Has the practice of naming another in Court opinions 
increased over time? 
Two: Which Justices most frequently name another in their 
opinions? 
Three: Do Justices name their ideological opponents more 
often than ideological allies? 
To answer the first question, the Article presents data on long-
term trends in personal references in Supreme Court opinions going 
back to 1946. It then focuses on the Roberts Court to evaluate the 
second and third questions. Figure 1 depicts the average number of 
references (by name) to other Justices during the Vinson (1946–
1953), Warren (1953–1969), Burger (1969–1986), Rehnquist (1986–
2005), and Roberts (2005-2015) Chief Justice eras. During the 
Vinson and Warren Courts, personal references were almost 
unknown. The Burger Court saw a noticeable uptick, but the average 
was still well under 0.2 references per opinion. Under the Rehnquist 
and Roberts Courts, the number of such references quintupled to 
nearly one reference per opinion. There has been a slight downturn in 
 
The Damaging Rhetoric of Antonin Scalia, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 907, 916 
(2006). 
22 RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 
353 (1996). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol54/iss1/19

















the frequency of personal references during the Roberts Court 
compared to the Rehnquist Court, from about 0.95 references per 
opinion to about 0.88. 
This striking increase in “naming” Justices fits with other research 
suggesting the Justices have become ruder and more individualistic—
resulting in a less respectful, less collegial atmosphere on the Court. 23 
The increase also fits with Wedeking and Zilis’s finding that the 
recent Court opinions use more disagreeable language compared to 
previous opinions.24  
Noting the dramatic increase of personal references brings us to 
the question of which Justices are driving this trend. Figure 2 presents 
relevant data. The height of each bar in Figure 2 indicates the number 
of times each Justice on the Roberts Court mentioned another Justice 
in a majority, concurring, or dissenting opinion, respectively. The 
Justices are arrayed from most liberal to most conservative. Mentions 
in majority opinions may be particularly important because these 
opinions articulate authoritative legal rulings and are the most widely 
read. Justices Stevens, Roberts, and Scalia stand out as naming other 
Justices particularly frequently in majority opinions, with Stevens 
and Scalia being the most extreme outliers. Combining majority, 
concurring, and dissenting opinions, Justices Stevens, Scalia, and 
Roberts lead the Court in personal references, with averages of 2.5, 
1.6 and 1.4 references per opinion, respectively. One takeaway from 
Figure 2 is that the Justices who name fellow Justices most frequently 
are not the swing Justices; the most frequent references tend to come 
from reliable liberals or conservatives.  
Table 1 shows individuals the Justices mention by name. The 
opinion authors are listed on the right, with the Justices listed in 
liberal to conservative order from top to bottom. Each row shows the 
relative frequency with which the opinion writer names a Justice. The 
named Justices are listed left to right in order of increasing 
conservatism. For example, the top row shows that Justice Stevens 
 
23 Wald, supra note 6, at 1382-1383; Lacovara, supra note 9. 
24 Wedeking and Zilis, supra note 11, at 18-19. 
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named Justice Ginsburg an average of 0.04 times per opinion, named 
Justice Scalia 0.82 times per opinion, and named Justice Thomas 0.39 
times per opinion.  
Shaded boxes in Table 1 indicate higher-than-average rates of 
naming. The darker gray boxes show cells above the 90th percentile 
in relative frequency. The lighter gray boxes indicate cells from the 
75th to 90th percentile in relative frequency. Notice that there are no 
shaded boxes in the center part of the table; moderate Justices do not 
tend to name other moderate Justices in opinions.  
In fact, Justices who could provide the swing vote are rarely 
named at all. Justices O'Connor and Kennedy have occupied the 
middle ground on the Court in recent years. Getting their vote was 
often crucial to forming a majority. It is noteworthy that these 
Justices are seldom named by other Justices, possibly because other 
Justices fear that alienating them would make it harder for them to 
garner majority support in future cases.25 
Most of the shaded boxes in Table 1 are concentrated in the upper 
right and lower left corners of the table, indicating that Justices tend 
to name their ideological opposites more frequently than their 
ideological allies or moderates.26 The patterns in naming seem to be 
associated with policy disagreements, because moderates seldom 
engage in this behavior, and ideological extremists most often name 
extremists of the opposite ideology (or Justice Scalia). The use of 
personal names may suggest heated arguments, or that the opinion-
writing Justice feels particularly strongly about the implications of 
the case. 
Justice Scalia is an exception to this pattern in two ways: first, 
Justice Scalia was named relatively frequently by fellow 
conservatives Justices Roberts and Alito and second, Justice Scalia 
named Justice Kennedy, a moderate, quite frequently. If Justices are 
more likely to be named by other Justices in cases with important 
 
25 Id at 8.  
26 However, the table shows that Justice Breyer is also named relatively 
frequently by both liberals and conservatives. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol54/iss1/19

















policy implications, then Justices who write more of these opinions 
would be named more often. Lazarus27 has found that Justice 
Kennedy was assigned to write the majority opinion in a 
disproportionately large number of highly salient decisions, so this 
may partially account for him being named frequently by Scalia. 
However, Scalia is unique among Justices in naming Kennedy so 
frequently, so the large number of salient decisions written by 
Kennedy does not completely explain the pattern. The same study 
finds that Justice Scalia was assigned to write the opinion in an 
average number of highly salient cases, so this does not seem to 
account for Justice Scalia being named so frequently.28   
CONCLUSION 
This Article examines one indicator of fraying personal 
relationships on the Supreme Court, personal references to other 
Justices in Court opinions. Scholars and observers of the Court have 
suggested that relations among the justices are less respectful than in 
previous times, that this decline in respect may be evident in the 
language of the Justices’ opinions, and that referring to fellow 
Justices by name may be particularly disrespectful.29 Judge Wald’s 
remarks on her name being used repeatedly in a court opinion 
indicate that this practice is unconventional and irksome. Personal 
references have increased dramatically during the Rehnquist and 
Roberts Courts, from being extremely rare during the 1950s and 
1960s, to very common after 2000. The dramatic change suggests 
that a norm of avoiding personal references may have existed on the 
Court prior to the 1980s, but has deteriorated. This increase in 
naming fits with other research suggesting the Court has become a 
less internally collegial institution. 
 
27 Richard J. Lazarus, Back to “Business” at the Supreme Court: The 
Administrative Side of Chief Justice Roberts,  129 HARV. L. REV. 33, 58-59.  
28 Id. at 58.  
29 See supra discussion on page 201.  
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Ideology and personality seem to be key factors in the patterns of 
naming other Justices. More ideologically extreme Justices name 
other Justices more often than those nearer the center. Justices are 
more likely to name their ideological opposites than their allies, and 
swing Justices are almost never named. Personal references take 
ideological divisions to the personal level. Justices may name other 
Justices because they feel strongly about a case or outcome, or to 
draw attention to a legal dispute. Justices seem to refrain from 
naming, and thereby alienating, Justices whose vote they may need in 
a future case. Beyond ideology, some personalities may simply have 
a tendency to ignore norms of restraint. Justices Scalia and Stevens 
stand out in this regard. Scalia’s pattern, in particular, shows less 
concern for avoiding alienating potential allies. 
Pushed by these ideological and personal motivations, some 
Justices have discarded norms that have contributed to the smooth 
functioning of the Court. Negotiation and compromise are more 
difficult when social relations are strained. The processing of the 
Court’s docket could be delayed by Justices who do not interact 
smoothly with each other.30 Justices who would otherwise be 
expected to vote together or join one another’s opinions might instead 
write separately or even join conflicting opinions. Most of the 
patterns shown here reinforce ideological divisions, suggesting that 
breakdowns in formal courtesies could make it more difficult for 
conservatives and liberals to work together, and lead to greater 
polarization on the Court. In this way, personal relationships on the 






30 On the topic of justices’ interactions to produce decisions, see 
FORREST MALTZMAN, JAMES F. SPRIGGS, AND PAUL J. WAHLBECK, 
CRAFTING LAW ON THE SUPREME COURT: THE COLLEGIAL GAME (2000). 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol54/iss1/19
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